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Abstract The purpose of this study is to investigate the association 
between board diversity and firm performance of 26 government-
linked companies (GLCs) and 26 non-government-linked companies 
(non-GLCs) in Malaysia. The study focuses on gender variable to 
explain the board diversity and tests its relationship towards firm 
performance as measured by return on equity (ROE) and return on 
asset (ROA). A final sample of 196 GLCs and non-GLCs listed on 
the Bursa Malaysia are used across four years from 2007 to 2010. 
The results fail to satisfy the expectation made for this study, thus 
rejecting the hypothesis that gender board diversity is positively 
related to firm performance. In conclusion, this study could not 
establish that gender diversity on boards would enhance firm 
performance due to the small average samples of women directors on 
the board of Malaysian companies. 
 
Keywords Board diversity; firm performance; gender. 
 
 
1 Introduction 
 
Growing businesses faces a range of challenges. As a business grows, 
different problems and opportunities demand different solutions. 
Frequent business challenges require a team namely the board of 
directors (BOD) who can act as a top level advisor and monitor the 
firm. They are responsible for protecting shareholders' assets and 
ensuring that they receive decent returns on their investment (Kennon, 
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2011). A well-functioning BOD is also expected to maximize 
shareholders’ wealth through an effective monitoring and controlling 
over the management as well as that ensuring good corporate 
governance practices are well- performed in the firm. 
 
Board characteristics affect the effectiveness of monitoring 
the management and the quality of corporate governance (Chien, 
2008). It should be noted that demographic is one of the 
characteristics of the boards. Demographic characteristics (e.g. age, 
tenure, gender, specialization) are related to many cognitive bases, 
values and perceptions that influence the decision making of BODs 
(Marimuthu & Kolandaisamy, 2009b). Therefore, the more complex 
the decision is (e.g. decision in strategic measure of the company), 
the more important an individual’s characteristics of the decision 
maker are required (Zee & Swagerman, 2009). Demographic 
characteristics such as tenure, age, experience, and board size are 
only some parts of the characteristics that contribute to the diversity 
of the board (McIntyre, Murphy & Mitchell, 2007). Additionally, 
diversity can be viewed in two perspectives; demographic and 
cognitive (Marimuthu & Kolandaisamy, 2009a). However, this study 
only focuses on one demographic characteristic of board diversity, i.e. 
gender, to investigate its effect on firm performance. 
 
Prior research by Marimuthu and Kolandaisamy (2009b) has 
looked at 100 public listed companies in Malaysia to investigate the 
influence of gender diversity on firm performance over the period of 
2000 to 2006. In order to make a comparison between government-
linked companies (GLCs) and non-government-linked companies 
(non-GLCs), this study creates a gap by selecting a final sample of 
196 listed GLCs and non-GLCs for a period of four years starting 
from 2007 until 2010. A four-year window period from the year 2007 
to 2010 is chosen as to reflect the effects of the revised corporate 
governance in Malaysia in year 2007 (The Malaysian Code on 
Corporate Governance, 2007) as well as to enable a better analysis 
with current issues and environment. It should be noted that the 
Malaysian government has performed the “GLC Transformation 
Programme” and one of the key principles is to create economic and 
shareholders’ value through enhanced or improved performance of 
GLCs (http://www.khazanah.com.my/faq.htm). Therefore, by 
examining the impact of board diversity on GLCs’ performance, the 
results of this study may be used to assist in realizing the key 
principle of GLCs’ transformation as well as to contribute to the 
development of GLCs in Malaysia. The main objective of this study 
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is to investigate the gender diversity on the board of directors by 
focusing on its impact on the firm performance and comparing 
between GLCs and non-GLCs. The statistical results of this study 
reveal a significant finding but it contradicts with what is 
hypothesized. 
 
 
2 Literature Review  
 
2.1 Board diversity 
 
Coffey and Wang (1998) define board diversity as the variation 
among its members and it is probably derived from multiple sources 
of board characteristics such as expertise and managerial 
background, personalities, learning styles, education, age and values. 
The more diverse the board, the more it can contribute to improve 
organizational performance by providing new idea, insight and 
perspective to the boards (Siciliano, 1996). 
 
However, several studies show that the effect of board 
diversity on team performance is not uniform (Dahlin et al., 2005). 
For instance, Carter et al. (2007) examine the relationship of ethnic 
and gender diversity in the three functions of the board committees 
namely, audit, executive compensation, and director nomination to 
firm performance and find that gender diversity has a positive impact 
on firm performance through audit committees of the board but not in 
executive compensation and director nomination committee, while 
ethnic diversity turn outs to have a positive impact on firm 
performance through all functions of the board committees. Dahlin et 
al. (2005) suggest that working in a diversified team can be 
challenging because the nature of the team diversity with various 
perspectives could result in difficulty for the team members to 
perform, communicate and coordinate their work. 
 
2.2 Gender diversity 
 
Prior literature documents that the positive impact created after the 
corporate scandals and collapse of high-profile companies such as 
Enron and WorldCom has enhanced the importance of monitoring 
role and corporate governance (Campbell & Vera, 2008). The 
existence of a new legislative after the crisis such as Sarbanes Oxley 
Act (SOX) 2002 has provided guidelines on board composition, 
board audit committees, board independence and other corporate 
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governance practices but neither one of that mentions the gender 
composition or diversity of BODs. However, although none of SOX 
guidelines specifically addresses any aspect of gender diversity, it is 
believed that the provisions of SOX and the listing exchanges have 
indirectly a major impact on the needs of roles and responsibilities of 
women on the board as a part of contributor to the firm performances 
(Dalton & Dalton, 2010). 
 
Previous studies have identified a negative result of gender 
diversity on the board. Adams and Ferreira (2009) argue that the 
average effect of gender diversity on firm performance is negative. 
At first impression, the correlation between gender diversity and firm 
value seems to be positive. However, it changes once they apply 
reasonable procedures to tackle omitted variables and reverse 
causality problems. Their finding suggests that gender diversity 
positively affects performance in firms that have weak governance. 
However, in firms with strong and good governance practices, they 
assert that determining gender quotas in BODs can reduce the firm’s 
value due to excessive monitoring. Wang and Clift (2009) examine 
the relationship between gender diversity and firm performance on 
top 500 Australian companies and indicate that there is no 
statistically significant association between ROA, ROE and 
shareholder return with the percentage of women members on the 
board. They conclude that there is no strong relationship between 
gender diversity on the board and firm performance based on two 
reasons; firstly, there are very few women on the boards and this is 
insufficient to give the benefit of woman’s talents on the board. 
Secondly, women representation is probably assumed to be only a 
process of socialization and consequently, the contribution of women 
directors on firm performance has never been realized on the boards 
(Rose, 2007). This argument is supported by Marimuthu and 
Kolandaisamy (2009b) who argue that the effect of gender diversity 
is only temporary and women do not play a main role in contributing 
to the firm. Their study on Top 100 Public Listed Companies in 
Malaysia on gender effect among the board members does not turn 
out to be significant with regard to ROA and ROE. 
 
Even though the results are contradicting and the positive or 
negative impact of women directors is still undetermined, most of the 
studies on relationship between gender diversity and performance 
suggest that women directors have a positive impact on board 
performance (Radlach et al., 2008). For example, Carter et al. (2007) 
use all firms listed on the U.S Fortune 500 over the period of 1998-
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2002 to investigate the effects of gender diversity on firm 
performance. The findings of this study supports the opinion that 
gender diversity on board committees appears to influence positively 
on firm performance by increasing the value for shareholders 
particularly through the audit function. This corresponds with 
Bathula (2008) who conducts a study based on data of firms listed on 
New Zealand Stock Exchange for a period of four years from 2004 to 
2007 and finds that gender diversity leads to enhanced firm 
performance. The findings of these two studies provide evidence to 
stakeholder perspective and resource dependency perspective that 
diversity is beneficial to firms and suggest that women directors have 
the ability to bring their point of views more effectively in a smaller 
board rather than in a larger board. In addition, previous studies 
suggest that the presence of gender diversity on the board contributes 
to enhanced firm performance.  
 
2.3 GLCs and non-GLCs 
 
As reported by Feng, Sun and Tong (2004), past studies provide 
argument by economists on the performance between private firms or 
non-government-linked companies (non-GLCs) and firms with 
government ownership or government-linked companies (GLCs). 
Focusing on performance of 30 GLCs in Singapore, they conclude 
that firms with government intervention could also bring good 
performance as efficient as the privately-held firms; mainly on their 
stock return.  In addition, Ang and Ding (2006) have also 
investigated the GLCs in Singapore. The results of their study seem 
to agree with the previous study done by Feng, Sun and Tong (2004) 
where Singaporean GLCs provide better valuations and corporate 
governance than the non-GLCs. Furthermore, Esa and Mohd Ghazali 
(2010) report significant increase in the extent of corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) disclosure in the annual reports of 27 GLCs in 
Malaysia for two years; 2005 and 2007. However, there are also 
contrasting findings where non-GLCs or privately-held firms 
outperform the GLCs as proved by Ab Razak, Ahmad and Joher 
(2011) in their research, where they find that non-GLCs perform 
better than GLCs in terms of corporate governance and other firms’ 
specific characteristics. 
 
2.4 Hypothesis development 
 
Previous studies on board diversity show mixed results of the 
relationship between gender diversity on the board of directors and 
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firm performance. Based on several studies conducted in prior years, 
Marimuthu and Kolandaisamy (2009b) come up with a similar 
hypothesis that gender diversity on boards is positively correlated 
with a firm’s financial performance. However, their research on top 
100 public listed companies in Malaysia has brought a non-
significant result towards the hypothesis developed. They conclude 
that women’s role is not felt in the board composition. In fact, the 
effect is only temporary; which is in year 2005, only one-year of the 
seven-year period of investigation. Similarly, Wang and Clift (2009) 
indicate that there is no statistically significant relationship between 
firm performance - measured in terms of ROA, ROE and 
shareholders’ return - and gender diversity on the board. The reason 
is that the very small number of women on the board is insufficient to 
deliver a critical impact and the advantages of their talents to the 
board.  
 
However, most studies find positive results on the 
association between gender diversity on boards and firm 
performance. Campbell and Vera (2008) argue that gender diversity 
on BODs has a positive impact on the firm’s value. They suggest that 
the most important focus for Spanish companies is the balance 
between women and men on the board rather than simply having the 
presence of women. They find that investors in Spain do not penalize 
firms which increase their woman board membership; in fact, 
investors expect that greater gender diversity on boards may generate 
economic benefits.  
 
Furthermore, Vera and Martinez (2010) who study gender 
diversity in SME’s board of directors find that gender diversity on 
BODs has a positive effect on firm performance. They indicate that 
woman’s representation on boards creates an advantage for the firms 
and contributes to the benefits of work groups such as variety of 
alternatives, opinions and strategies that are able to overcome the 
problems of integration as well as slowness and difficulties in the 
decision making process. On the other hand, Carter et al. (2007) find 
that gender diversity on BODs has a positive effect on firm 
performance particularly in audit committees. The results show that 
gender diversity among board members appears to create value for 
shareholders. Finally, boards with diverse gender have more 
alternatives to employ in the decision making process (Vera & 
Martinez, 2010) and this variation may improve the appearance of 
the firm which positively affects the customers’ view and perception 
of the firm and contribute to a better performance (Pohjanen et al., 
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2010). Hence, as the current study is looking at Malaysian companies, 
a similar hypothesis with research done by Marimuthu and 
Kolandaisamy (2009b) as well as other prior studies has been 
developed taking into account the different sample size and years, 
which focused on GLCs and non-GLCs in similar years and industry 
as well as their market capitalization. The hypothesis developed for 
both GLCs and non-GLCs is as follows: 
 
H1: Gender diversity among board members is positively related to 
firm performance. 
 
 
3     Research Methodology 
 
3.1 Sample selection 
 
The sample consists of government-linked companies (GLCs) and 
non-government-linked companies (non-GLCs) listed on Bursa 
Malaysia for a period of four years from 2007 until 2010. The list of 
GLCs is obtained from the Ministry of Finance (MOF) website; 
(http://www.malaysiaco.com/government-linked-company). For the 
purpose of the study, only listed companies and non- financial 
companies on Bursa Malaysia are selected. The selection of non-
financial companies is important to control the heterogeneous 
characteristics of the companies selected (Marimuthu & 
Kolandaisamy, 2009b).  
 
The list of listed GLCs in Bursa Malaysia is obtained from 
the website of Putrajaya Committee on GLCs High Performance 
(PCG); (http://www.pcg.gov.my/trans_manual.asp). It states that the 
total number of listed GLCs in Malaysia is 33 companies as of 13 
March 2009. The exclusion of seven listed financial companies 
leaves a balance of 26 listed non-financial companies used for this 
study. Since the purpose of the study is to make a comparison 
between GLCs and non-GLCs, another 26 non-GLCs are selected 
from companies listed on Bursa Malaysia in order to match them 
with the GLCs. 
 
The complete number of samples for this study should be 
208 samples (104 samples of GLCs and 104 samples of non-GLCs). 
However, due to the unavailability of important data from several 
firms’ annual reports and some outliers in the data collected, the 
number is reduced to a final sample of 196 firms consisting of 99 
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samples of GLCs and 97 non-GLCs as shown in Table 1. 
 
 
 
3.2 Data collection 
 
The data for this study came from multiple sources of secondary data. 
The primary sources of this study were extracted from companies’ 
annual reports downloaded from Bursa Malaysia website. The 
information regarding gender diversity on boards was collected from 
the company’s annual reports. In addition, financial databases, 
namely DataStream and OSIRIS, were used in order to retrieve 
information regarding the size, performances and the financial ratios 
of the firms. 
 
Data on the independent variables represented by the board 
characteristics were obtained from the annual report of each company 
through content analysis. For control variables, the firm’s size was 
collected from OSIRIS which explains the total assets of the firm 
while types of firm’s industries were classified in reference to Bursa 
Malaysia.  
 
3.3  Variable measurement 
 
In this study, the general multivariate model is used as the basis of 
empirical analysis for testing the hypothesis. The hypothesized 
relationships are modelled as follows: 
 
 
 
 
Table 1:  Firms by Industry 
 GLCs Non-GLCs 
Valid Trading/services 55 51 
Plantation 8 8 
Consumer products 11 11 
Industrial Products 12 11 
Technology 3 4 
Construction 4 4 
IPC 3 4 
Properties 3 4 
Total 99 97 
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Model 1: GLCs 
 
ROAt =  β0 + β1gendert + β2CFirmSizet + β3Industryt + εt 
 
ROEt =  β0 + β1gendert + β2CFirmSizet + β3Industryt + εt 
 
Model 2: Non-GLCs 
 
ROAt =  β0 + β1gendert + β2CFirmSizet + β3Industryt + εt 
 
ROEt  = β0 + β1gendert + β2CFirmSizet + β3Industryt + εt 
 
All variables included in this study are measured as shown in Table 
2. 
 
Table 2: Measurement of Variables 
Variables Measurements Literature 
Dependent 
variables 
Firm Performance :  
1) Return on asset  
   (ROA) 
 
 
2) Return on equity  
   (ROE) 
 
 
 
Independent 
Variables 
1) Gender  
diversity 
 
 
 
Net Income divided 
by total asset 
 
 
Net Income divided 
by total equity. 
 
 
 
 
Ratio scale: Woman 
directors divided by 
total board directors. 
 
 
 
Marimuthu and 
Kolandaisamy 
(2009b) 
 
Marimuthu and 
Kolandaisamy 
(2009b) 
Pohjanen et al. (2010) 
 
 
Marimuthu and 
Kolandaisamy 
(2009b) 
Pohjanen et al. (2010) 
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Table 2 (continued): Measurement of Variables 
Variables Measurements Literature 
 
Control Variables 
1) Firm size : 
 
 
 
2) Firm Industry : 
 
 
Approximated by the 
natural logarithm of 
total assets.  
 
 
Control for industry 
with a dummy variable. 
Industry dummy for 
property, construction, 
trading and services, 
consumer product, 
infrastructure, 
plantations, industrial 
product and 
technology. Measured 
as dummy variable 
taking the value of 1 if 
the firm belongs to a 
particular industry, 
otherwise 0. 
 
Ees, Postma and 
Sterken (2003)  
Campbell and Vera 
(2008) 
 
Carter et al. (2007) 
Post et al. (2011) 
Ehikioya (2007) 
 
 
3.4  Data analysis  
  
The multiple regressions are used to test the hypothesis. By using 
Statistical Package for Social Science (SPSS), this study examines 
whether or not there is a significant relationship between gender 
diversity on boards and both ROA and ROE.  
 
 
4          Findings and Discussions 
 
To analyze the results, statistical tools employed for this study are 
descriptive statistics, Independent sample t-test, Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test, Pearson correlation and multiple regressions. 
 
 Firstly, all the variables are explained by descriptive 
statistical tests which involve a descriptive statistic test for the 
numerical variables (gender diversity, total assets, return on assets 
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and return on equity); and a frequency statistic test for the categorical 
variable (firm industry). The results are shown in Table 3 for GLCs 
and Table 4 for non-GLCs. 
 
Table 3: Descriptive Statistic test for GLCs 
 N Min Max Mean Std Dev. 
Gender 
Diversity 
99 .00 .38 .10 .11 
Total 
Assets 
(Firms’ 
size) 
99 59,226 74,081,100 11,734,111 16,689,111 
Return on 
Assets 
99 -14.67 25.20 7.37 5.79 
Return on 
Equity 
99 -27.24 39.50 11.20 9.61 
Industry 99 1 8 2.38 1.95 
 
Table 4: Descriptive Statistic test for non-GLCs 
 N Min Max Mean Std Dev. 
Gender 
Diversity 
97 .00 .33 .06 .09 
Total 
Assets 
(Firms’ 
size) 
97 190,870 
262,000,00
0 
8,665,713 32,811,258 
Return on 
Assets 
97 -9.13 20.47 5.13 5.45 
Return on 
Equity 
97 -28.66 33.90 8.06 10.41 
Industry 97 1 8 2.49 2.11 
 
From Tables 3 and 4, first of all, with regard to gender 
diversity, the statistics show the mean is 0.10 for GLCs ranging from 
a minimum of 0 to a maximum of 0.38 which explains that the 
average percentage of women on boards is just near 10 percent. The 
average for gender diversity in non-GLCs is 0.06 at a minimum of 0 
to a maximum of 0.33 which is lower than GLCs. Next, for total 
assets, looking at the maximum and minimum amount in both GLCs 
and non-GLCs, the results generally show a huge difference in firms’ 
size. On the other hand, the results for the dependent variables show 
the average ROA and ROE for GLCs are 7.37 and 11.20 respectively. 
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This indicates that the mean for ROA is lower than the mean for 
ROE. The average ROE for non-GLCs is 8.06 and 5.13 for ROA. 
Similar results are shown in GLCs where the mean for ROA is also 
lower than the mean of ROE. Meanwhile, for the firm industry 
variable, we can see that there is not much difference between the 
mean for GLCs (2.38) and non-GLCs (2.49). 
 
Next, Table 5 reports the significant difference of mean 
variance for ROA and ROE between GLCs and non-GLCs, as 
performed by the independent-sample t-test. The t-test results show 
that there are no significant differences in the mean value of ROA 
and ROE in both GLCs and non-GLCs. 
 
Table 5: T-test for mean comparison of ROA and ROE between 
GLCs and non-GLCs 
Variable Mean difference t-stat P-value 
ROA -.295 -.196 .845 
ROE -3.46 -.928 .355 
Note:  
Grouping variable:  
(GLC assigned value of 1, non-GLC, assigned value of 2) 
***Significance at 0.01 level; **Significance at 0.05 level; *Significance at 
0.10 level 
 
Table 6: Pearson Correlation Test for GLCs  
 
Gender 
Diversity 
Total 
Assets 
Firm 
Industry 
ROA ROE 
Gender 
Diversity 
1     
Total 
Assets 
.26** 1   
 
 
Firm 
Industry 
-.23** -.35** 1   
ROA -.19 -.07 -.30** 1  
ROE -.14 .01 -.36** .80** 1 
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Further, correlation analysis test is used to determine 
linearity of relationship (Magpayo, 2007) and describe the strength as 
well as the direction of the linear relationship. Tables 6 and 7 report 
the correlations between the variables used in the regressions for 
GLCs and non-GLCs. The results show that for GLCs, there is no 
significant relationship between the independent variable, i.e. gender 
diversity and the dependent variables, i.e. ROA and ROE. Yet, the 
results show a significant negative correlation at 5% level between 
the two variables (-.33 and -.39 respectively) in non-GLCs. 
Nonetheless, there are highly significant positive correlations at 1% 
level between ROA and ROE as a measure for firm performance in 
both GLCs (.80) and non-GLCs (.71). 
 
Table 7: Pearson Correlation Test for non-GLCs 
 
Gender 
Diversity 
Total 
Assets 
Firm 
Industry 
ROA ROE 
Gender 
Diversity 
1     
Total 
Assets 
.04 1    
Firm 
Industry 
.21* -.06 1   
ROA -.33** .089 -.17 1  
ROE -.39** .09 -.184 .71** 1 
 
Finally, multiple regression analysis is conducted to test the 
hypothesis developed in this study. To ensure a valid model being 
performed in this study, the ROA and ROE variables are regressed 
separately on the independent and control variables. Tables 8 and 9 
report the statistical results for Model 1 and Model 2. 
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Table 8: Regression Results for Model 1: GLCs (N=99) 
Variables Unstandardized 
Coefficient 
Beta 
ROA  
(t-stat) 
Unstandardized 
Coefficient 
Beta 
ROE  
(t-stat) 
(Constant) 13.72 2.17 12.76 1.15 
Gender 
Diversity 
-8.12 -1.32 -11.73 -1.08 
Total 
Assets 
-1.52 -1.79* -.75 -.50 
Firm 
Industry 
(Dummy) 
Included Included 
Adjusted 
R
2
 
19.8% 10.0% 
F-Statistic 
(P-value) 
3.685 (0.001) 2.210 (0.028) 
Notes: *** Significant at the 0.01 level; ** Significant at the 0.05 level; and 
* Significant at the 0.10 level 
 
Based on Table 8, the adjusted R
2 
values indicate that 
independent and control variables in GLCs contribute about 19.8% to 
changes in ROA and 10.0% to ROE. Then, in order to observe the 
overall significance of the model, F-test is conducted using Analysis 
of Variance (ANOVA). From the results in Table 8, the F-ratio value 
of 3.685 and 2.210 are significant at 1% and 5% level respectively, 
indicating that at least one of the explanatory variables in Model 1 
has an effect on the dependent variables, i.e. ROA and ROE. 
Furthermore, the results show non-significant negative results 
between gender diversity and firm performance, i.e. ROA (-1.32) and 
ROE (-1.08).  
 
Next, based on Table 9, the adjusted R
2 
values show that 
independent and control variables in non-GLCs contribute about 
31.7% to changes in ROA and 11.4% to ROE. The F-ratio value of 
5.945 and 2.366 are both significant at 1% level % indicating that at 
least one of the explanatory variables in Model 2 has an effect on the 
dependent variables, i.e. ROA and ROE. In addition, again, the 
results appear to have the same significant negative results in non-
GLCs, but at 5% level between gender diversity and firm 
performance, i.e. ROA (-2.02) and ROE (-1.99). Hence, despite its 
significance on both models, it shows the opposite sign than what has 
been expected from this study. Thus, the regression results for both 
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Model 1 and 2 reject the hypothesis, H1, i.e. Gender diversity among 
board members is positively related to firm performance. 
 
Table 9: Regression Results for Model 2: non-GLCs (N=97) 
Variables Unstandardized 
Coefficient Beta 
ROA  
(t-stat) 
Unstandardized 
Coefficient Beta 
ROE 
 (t-stat) 
(Constant) -4.67 -.878 -13.37 -1.16 
Gender 
Diversity 
-12.23 -2.02** -26.23 -1.99** 
Total Assets 1.16 1.60 3.07 1.95** 
Firm Industry 
(dummy)  
Included Included 
Adjusted R
2
 31.7% 11.4% 
F-Statistic (P-
value) 
5.945 (0.000) 2.366 (0.019) 
Notes: *** Significant at the 0.01 level; ** Significant at the 0.05 level; and 
* Significant at the 0.10 level 
 
Overall, the statistical results for both GLCs and non-GLCs 
are surprising since previous studies show the opposite results. These 
may be due to different sample size, observation years and 
classification of the listed companies into GLCs and Non-GLCs, as 
compared to the study done by Marimuthu and Kolandaisamy 
(2009b) which focuses on top 100 listed companies in Malaysia. The 
results also indicate that neither GLCs nor non-GLCs have a large 
number of women directors on the board to sufficiently generalize 
the board gender diversity. 
 
 
5 Conclusion 
 
This study attempts to examine the relationship between gender 
diversity and firm performance. A research was performed to give a 
thorough explanation on how gender diversity on boarda affects firm 
performance measured as return on equity (ROE) and return on assets 
(ROA). The study was conducted in Malaysia using 26 GLCS and 26 
non-GLCs listed on Bursa Malaysia over the years of 2007 until 
2010.  
 
The results show that non-GLCs exhibit a more negative 
impact with regard to the relationship between gender diversity on 
boards and firm performance, even after controlling the firm’s 
specific factors such as firms’ size and industry. The results indicate 
that significant relationships are found between gender diversity and 
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firm performance, i.e. ROA and ROE only at the non-GLCs (at 5 
percent level). Surprisingly, these significant results show a negative 
relationship on firm performance. The finding is totally against the 
hypothesis developed in this study which suggests that gender 
diversity on boards has a positive impact on firm performance. It is 
believed that the reason for this is related to the small number of 
women directors on boards. Similar to other countries such as 
Sweden (Pohjanen et al., 2010) and  Spain (Campbell & Vera, 2008), 
Malaysian large-cap firms have a minimal woman’s participation in 
the boardroom which is not enough to give the Malaysian firms a 
critical impact or the advantages of women’s involvement (Wang & 
Clift, 2009). At the same time, it somehow denies the expectation 
that GLCs should follow the government’s recommendation on the 
woman’s participation in the decision making process. 
 
In conclusion, the findings suggest that homogeneity in 
gender has a more competitive advantage rather than heterogeneity 
among board members. It could be that men and women may have 
varied opinions to manage a firm which can lead to conflicts and 
lower the firm performance. However, the results may be affected by 
the small average samples of gender diversity which indicate that the 
composition of gender on the board is unbalanced and dominated by 
men directors. If Malaysian firms have higher level of gender 
diversity on the board to be used as samples in this research, it may 
result in different findings such as increased performance as shown 
by previous studies (Carter et al., 2007; Campbell & Vera, 2008). In 
addition, the announcement made by the Prime Minister that the 
Cabinet has now approved a policy that women must comprise at 
least 30% of those in decision-making positions in the corporate 
sector by 2016 (Nik Anis, 2011) can be seen as the first step to 
develop and encourage more diversity in the corporate board. The 
new policy is seen as a wise action and it should be supported and 
assisted by regulatory bodies to ensure consistent implementation by 
the firms in Malaysia. 
 
5.1 Recommendations for future research 
 
There are a lot of other areas and extensions that could be possible 
for future research. This study could be replicated by considering 
other board characteristic variables such as ethnicity, education, 
tenure, age and religion of the directors on the board. It would be 
interesting to know the impact of those diverse variables on the firm 
performance. In addition, future research may consider employing 
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different formulas to measure the firm performance other than ROE 
and ROA. As Bursa Malaysia views corporate social responsibility 
(CSR) as an integral part towards being an internationally 
competitive marketplace, it would be very useful to find whether the 
CSR of the firms is influenced by the diversity of the board. 
Furthermore, future research should be extended by taking newly 
updated list of GLCs.  Lastly, future research may also focus on all 
GLCs regardless of listed or non-listed in Bursa Malaysia. Due to 
their unique features and policies, there is a probability that the 
results will contribute to better governance practices in GLCs and 
provide a value- added feature to regulators as well as the Malaysian 
government as a major institutional ownership. 
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